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1. Introduction
I study the relationships between several "stability" criteria relevant to evolutionary game
theory. The first results, presented in Section 2, concern some established concepts: I show
that neutral stability (Maynard Smith 1982) does not imply robustness against equilibrium
entrants (Swinkels 1992). It is already known that no implication runs the other way (Weibull
1995). I show also that the two criteria taken together do not imply evolutionary stability in
the sense of Maynard Smith & Price (1973).
The second set of results, presented in Section 3, relate to two new stability criteria
which I introduce: robustness against admissible entrants and robustness against iteratively
admissible entrants. The former concept is strictly stronger than the latter. I argue that both
have natural motivations in the spirit of Swinkels' (1992) criterion of robustness against
equilibrium entrants. However, each of the new criteria neither implies nor is implied by
respectively neutral stability and robustness against equilibrium entrants. I show also that
there exist games in which no strategy satisfies any of the hitherto mentioned criteria. Finally,
I show that the last result mentioned in the previous paragraph can be strengthened: Neutral
stability taken together with robustness against both admissible and equilibrium entrants do
not imply evolutionary stability.
The analysis below deals with mixed extensions of finite symmetric 2-player normal
form games. See Weibull (1995) for a detailed presentation of such structures. The following
notation is used: In any given game,  A„˘ denotes either of the players' set of (mixed)
strategies (infinite-action unless singleton), and  u:A·Aﬁ￿ denotes the associated payoff
function. With x,y˛A, u(x,y) is the payoff to strategy x when paired against strategy y. The
notation e￿y+(1-e)￿x is used to denote the strategy which puts probability weight e on y, etc.2
2. Results on established criteria
The following well-known definitions specify conditions under which a strategy may be
deemed more or less impregnable to evolutionary forces:
DEFINITION 1 (Maynard Smith & Price 1973): x˛A is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
if "y˛A it holds that (i) u(x,x)‡u(y,x), and (ii) u(x,x)=u(y,x) ￿ u(x,y)>u(y,y).
 DEFINITION 2 (Maynard Smith 1982): x˛A is a neutrally stable strategy (NSS) if "y˛A it
holds that (i) u(x,x)‡u(y,x), and (ii) u(x,x)=u(y,x) ￿ u(x,y)‡u(y,y).
 DEFINITION 3 (Swinkels 1992): x˛A is robust against equilibrium entrants (REE) if $e*˛
(0,1) such that  "y˛A, y„x and "e˛(0,e*) it holds that yˇargmax z˛A u(z,e￿y+(1-e)￿x).
It is immediate from the definitions that if x˛A is ESS then x is NSS. Swinkels (1992) shows
that if x˛A is ESS then x is REE. Weibull (1992, Section 2.3.2) points out that in a game such
that  u(a,b)=u(c,d) "a,b,c,d˛A (with A not singleton) any strategy is NSS but no strategy is
REE, so neutral stability does not imply robustness against equilibrium entrants. The
following game shows that no implication runs the other way:
 a  b  c
a 1,1 0,1 1,1
b 1,0 1,1 0,2
c 1,1 2,0 0,0 G1
In G1, the strategy a is not NSS (b can "invade" in the sense that condition (ii) of Definition 2
is violated). However, a is REE since "y˛A, y„a and "e>0 it holds that
yˇargmax z˛A u(z,e￿y+(1-e)￿a), as is easily verified.
A strategy may be both NSS and REE without being ESS. This is an immediate
consequence of the last result of the next section (based on G6).3
3. Results involving two new criteria
In order to motivate the two new stability criteria that will be introduced in this section, it is
convenient to first consider a reformulation of the REE concept:
DEFINITION 3': x˛A is robust against equilibrium entrants (REE) if $e*˛(0,1) such that "y˛A
it holds that (i) u(x,x)‡u(y,x), and (ii) u(x,x)=u(y,x) ￿ [u(x,y)>u(y,y) or "e˛(0,e*) it holds that
yˇargmax z˛A u(z,e￿y+(1-e)￿x)].
Definition 3' is equivalent to Definition 3. To see this, suppose first that strategy x˛A is REE
according to Definition 3. Swinkels (1992) shows that (x,x) then must be a (proper) Nash
equilibrium, so u(x,x)‡u(y,x) "y˛A, implying that x meets condition (i) of Definition 3'. That
x also meets condition (ii) of Definition 3' is immediate. Conversely, suppose x˛A is REE
according to Definition 3'. Given Swinkels' (1992) finding that an ESS must be REE, it is
easy to see that x then must be REE according to Definition 3.
Definition 3' makes clear how the REE and ESS criteria relate to each other. Both
demand that for x˛A to pass the respective tests, it must be a best response against itself. The
ESS criterion moreover requires that any alternative best reply y˛A to x must do strictly
worse than x against y. This is sufficient for x to be REE, but x passes the test also if y is not
an equilibrium entrant in Swinkels' (1992) sense. Condition (ii) of Definition 3' effectively
exclude as potential invaders all those alternative best responses to x that lack a quality of
post-entry optimality.
In Swinkels' (1992, p 307) words, the REE criterion "strikes a middle ground between
the total absence of of rationality assumed by evolutionary game theory and the strenuous
rationality requirements of traditional game theory". However, it is not obvious that the only
or the most natural quality to impose on potential invaders is to assume they have the
foresight to choose post-entry optimal strategies. A reasonable alternative might be to require
entrants that are alternative best responses to  x to choose strategies that satisfy some
"rationality" properties that have some kind of decision-theoretic appeal. More generally, I
suggest replacing condition (ii) of Definition 1 with a condition such that "u(x,x)=u(y,x)￿4
[u(x,y)>u(y,y) or yˇR]", where R˝A contains the set of strategies that are "rational" according
to some criterion.
Gans (1994) studies "evolutionary selection of beliefs" and performs an exercise
which fits into this framework. Translated to the present setting, he considers the cases where
R is equal to respectively the set of strategies that are not strictly dominated and the set of
rationalizable strategies (=those that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies). However, in these particular cases no leeway is offered in addition to Definition 1,
so Gans' (1994) concepts are equivalent to the ESS concept.2
Here, two new definitions will be considered. The following terminology is used: A
strategy is admissible iff it is not (weakly) dominated, the strategy is iteratively admissible iff
it survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies where at each round every dominated
strategy is eliminated.
DEFINITION 4: x˛A is robust against admissible entrants (RAE) if "y˛A it holds that (i)
u(x,x)‡u(y,x), and (ii) u(x,x)=u(y,x) ￿ [u(x,y)>u(y,y) or x is not admissible].
DEFINITION 5: x˛A is robust against iteratively admissible entrants (RIE) if "y˛A it holds
that (i) u(x,x)‡u(y,x), and (ii) u(x,x)=u(y,x) ￿ [u(x,y)>u(y,y) or x is not iteratively admissible].
In promoting his REE criterion, Swinkels (1992, Fig. 2) provides an example of a game in
which no ESS exist and nevertheless a strategy seems "stable". The reader may verify that
that strategy is also RAE and RIE. However, these criteria are neither weaker nor stronger
than the REE criterion. The following example based on the game G2 shows that neither of
the two new criteria implies robustness against equilibrium entrants:
                                                
2 To see why this happens, suppose x˛A satisfies either of Gans' criteria but yet is not ESS. Then there must
exist a non-rationalizable strategy z˛A such that u(z,x)=u(x,x). However, since (x,x) must be a Nash equilibrium
and any best reply to x then must be rationalizable it must hold that u(z,x)<u(x,x). This is a contradiction.5
 a  b  c
a 1,1 0,1 2,1
b 1,0 1,1 0,1
c 1,2 1,0 1,1 G2
In G2, the strategy a is RAE and RIE but not REE (the dominated strategy b can invade).
On the other hand, robustness against equilibrium entrants does not imply any of the
new criteria. This can be illustrated using the following game G3:
 r  s  p
r 1,1 2,0 0,2
s 0,2 1,1 2,0
p 2,0 0,2 1,1 G3
In  G3, the strategy (r/3+s/3+p/3) is REE (cf. the discussion of Example 2.8 in Weibull
(1992)), but this strategy is neither RAE nor RIE.
Neither of the two new criteria imply neutral stability. This can be shown using G1, in
which game the strategy a is RAE and RIE but not NSS.  Conversely, neutral stability does
not imply any of the new criteria. This can be shown using a game such that u(a,b)=u(c,d) "
a,b,c,d˛A (with A not singleton), in which any strategy is NSS but no strategy is RAE or RIE.
In the games considered so far the sets of strategies which are RAE and RIE have
coincided. It is obvious from the Definitions 4 and 5 that if x˛A is RAE it must be RIE. The
following example illustrates that the converse is not true (in contrast to Gans' (1994) cases
where iterated elimination of potential entrants makes no difference):6
 a  b  c  d
a 1,1 0,1 0,1 2,1
b 1,0 1,1 0,1 0,0
c 1,0 1,0 1,1 0,1
d 1,2 0,0 1,0 1,1 G4
In G4, a (which is the unique iteratively admissible strategy) is RIE. However, a is not RAE
(the admissible strategy c can invade).
It is well-known that strategies which are ESS, NSS, or REE fail to exist in some
games. The same goes for the RAE and RIE criteria, as is evident from e.g. G3. The following
game (which appears in Example 2.7 in Weibull (1995)) illustrates that even the seemingly
very weak stability requirement that a strategy should meet any of the hitherto discussed
criteria would fail existence in some games:
 a  b  c
a 1,1 1,0 0,1
b 0,1 1,1 1,0
c 1,0 0,1 1,1 G5
In G5, no strategy satisfies any of the criteria discussed so far (the successful invaders under
the NSS criterion discussed in Example 2.7 in Weibull (1992) work for the other criteria too).
Finally, the following game G5 shows that a strategy may simultaneously satisfy all
the criteria of NSS, REE, RIE, and RAE, but yet not be ESS:
 a  b  c
a 1,1 1,1 1,1
b 1,1 1,1 0,2
c 1,1 2,0 0,0 G67
In G6, the strategy a is not ESS (b can invade), but satisfies all the other properties.
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